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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
How States Can Respond to the AHCA: 
Using the McCarran-Ferguson Act
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
The House of Representatives has passed the 
American Health Care Act (AHCA).1 As of this 
writing, it remains unclear what the Senate will do 
and whether and in what form the AHCA might 
become law. Nevertheless, the chance that 
something similar to the AHCA might become 
law is substantial enough that state governments 
should be prepared. Moreover, the Trump 
administration has been threatening to destabilize 
state insurance markets on its own, even without 
congressional action.2 State governments will thus 
need to start thinking creatively about how to 
bolster their insurance markets, whatever the fate 
of the AHCA in the Senate.
As we explained in a prior article,3 the AHCA 
would pass state governments a hot potato in that 
the bill’s reforms would radically destabilize the 
individual insurance markets within each state, 
unless each state government promptly 
responded to the AHCA with countervailing 
reforms. This conclusion holds even more 
strongly regarding the new version of the AHCA 
passed by the House on May 4, as that version of 
the bill would pose an even greater and more 
extensive threat to the viability of insurance 
markets within each state.
The version of the AHCA passed by the House 
retained most of the features of the original, with 
a few major additions. Most importantly, federal 
funding for Medicaid was cut even further, and 
states were given the option to permit insurers to 
provide far less generous health insurance 
options. This article focuses on the implications of 
the latter change.
That change is important in and of itself, but 
we focus on it because it poses a new threat to 
state insurance markets. We will explain how that 
threat could be countered through a type of state 
government response that we have not yet 
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In this edition of Academic Perspectives on 
SALT, Gamage and Shanske write that passage 
of the American Health Care Act as proposed 
could have serious ramifications for states if 
enacted. Its reforms, they write, would 
destabilize the insurance market in each state. 
They advise states to start thinking creatively 
about how to bolster their insurance markets to 
prepare for possible changes.
1
We began writing our first article on the AHCA right after it 
was introduced, on March 6. By the time we submitted that article 
to State Tax Notes, the AHCA had been pulled. It was pulled March 
24, but we decided to publish the article anyway, thinking the 
AHCA might return. And indeed, it did return, in a slightly 
modified form that was passed by the House on May 4.
2
Nathaniel Weixel, “Trump Threatens to Stop Obamacare 
Payments,” The Hill, May 11, 2017.
3
David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “The American Health 
Care Act Would Toss the States a Hot Potato,” State Tax Notes, May 
8, 2017, p. 579.
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discussed or seen discussed by others: that is, 
state governments could levy a discriminatory 
excise tax on certain insurance providers.
To begin our analysis, remember that the new 
version of the AHCA would permit state 
governments to authorize more bare-bones 
insurance offerings by requiring fewer “essential 
health benefits.” There are both positive and 
negative implications of that change.
On the positive side, the change could help to 
stabilize the individual insurance markets in 
states that take that option. That is because 
insurance plans that offer fewer benefits may turn 
out to be cheap enough for individuals to 
purchase with their (in many cases, much 
reduced) premium tax credits. Of course, there is 
a good question whether one should consider the 
holders of bare-bones policies as being insured in 
any meaningful sense.4 Thus, regardless of 
whether a state opts for the waiver,5 states should 
be ready to face either many more uninsured or 
many more worse-insured citizens compared 
with the status quo.
Now consider a negative implication of the 
AHCA’s new provision. Under current law, the 
definition of essential health benefits plays a key 
role in regulating employer-sponsored health 
insurance plans, as the definition is relevant to 
determining the scope of the ban on annual and 
lifetime limits that was established by the 
Affordable Care Act (and that would be retained 
by the AHCA).6 That ban is crucial because it 
prevents employers and other insurance offerers 
from designing plans that would primarily 
benefit healthier insureds while providing 
incentives for the sickest insureds to seek 
exchange plans after they exceed the spending 
limits. Without that ban, insurance offerers 
outside the exchanges would face very large 
incentives to design plans that would send their 
sickest and costliest insureds to the exchanges, 
which would almost certainly send the exchanges 
into death spirals.
Consider an insurer facing the ban on lifetime 
limits. One option it might try would be to offer a 
plan that simply does not cover many expensive 
medical situations. That is where the definition of 
essential health benefits comes into play. So long 
as the operative definition of essential health 
benefits is sufficiently broad, an insurer could not 
attempt an end run around the lifetime limits ban 
by offering plans with minimal benefits.
Large multistate employer-provided 
insurance plans are permitted to choose the 
essential health benefits definitions of any state in 
which they operate.7 Thus, if any one state were to 
choose a skimpier definition of essential health 
benefits and the law and regulations guiding 
implementation of the AHCA remain as they are, 
then any firm that opts to use a waiver-state’s 
essential health benefits definition would impose 
a potentially huge cost on the insurance markets 
of other states.
Put another way, if even a single state selects a 
skimpy definition for essential health benefits, 
any multistate employer operating in that state 
could opt to use that state’s definition for its 
operations in all states. That would allow the 
employer to effectively circumvent the annual 
and lifetime limits, as those limits would apply 
only to health services covered by the skimpy 
essential health benefits definition. All health 
services other than those covered by the skimpy 
essential health benefits definition could be made 
subject to annual and lifetime limits.
Through that plan design, multistate 
employers could provide insurance offerings that 
would be attractive to their healthy employees 
while saving enormous costs by forcing their 
sickest and costliest employees to seek coverage 
on insurance exchanges, once those employees 
had exceeded the annual or lifetime limits 
applicable to their more costly health conditions 
(to the extent that those conditions would be 
4
Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate H.R. 1628, 
American Health Care Act of 2017 (May 24, 2017) (“A few million 
people among the uninsured would use tax credits to purchase 
policies that would not cover major medical risks, CBO and JCT 
estimate. Those policies would be priced to closely match the size 
of the credits. Although such policies would provide some benefits, 
they would not provide enough financial protection in the event of 
a serious and costly illness to be considered insurance”).
5
States do not seem to be in a rush to commit to permitting 
more bare bones policies. Rachana Pradhan, “Even Red States Are 
Wary of Ditching Obamacare Protections,” Politico, May 5, 2017.
6
For a thorough explanation of this, see Matthew Fiedler, 
“Allowing States to Define ‘Essential Health Benefits’ Could 
Weaken ACA Protections Against Catastrophic Costs for People 
With Employer Coverage Nationwide,” Brookings Institution (May 
2, 2017).
7
See 45 Code of Federal Regulations 147.126(c)(1).
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exempted from the operative skimpy essential 
health benefits definition).8
What might state governments do to prevent 
their individual insurance markets from 
succumbing to death spirals because of this 
threat? In our prior article, we explained how a 
state government could impose its own 
individual mandate or reinsurance or risk-
corridor program.9 Alternatively, a state 
government might establish its own health 
insurance option — such as a state-level public 
option.
Yet none of those efforts would likely be 
enough if the current version of the AHCA 
becomes law. In addition to those measures, states 
would need to somehow counteract the threat 
posed by multistate employers designing plans 
around the skimpy essential health benefits 
definitions of other states.
The best way for state governments to 
respond to that threat would probably require 
levying some sort of tax or other charge on 
insurance providers that avail themselves of the 
skimpier essential health benefits definition of 
another state. Could a state government in effect 
impose an excise tax to discourage that sort of 
forum shopping? For the reasons discussed 
below, our tentative answer is yes.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act states that 
“silence on the part of the Congress shall not be 
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation 
or taxation of that business by the several 
States.”10 In other words, states can regulate or tax 
insurance companies in a discriminatory way 
without running afoul of the dormant commerce 
clause.11 This power is not without limits, because 
any such tax or regulation must pass rational-
basis scrutiny under the equal protection clause.12 
But that review is very deferential, so the state 
power is substantial.
Importantly, the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
should allow states to regulate insurance in a 
manner that would otherwise violate the dormant 
commerce clause. Thus, a state-level excise tax on 
insurance plans that use the skimpier essential 
health benefits definitions of other states seems 
likely to pass muster. The analysis would likely 
proceed in two steps.
First, a state tax that facially discriminates 
against an insurance provider because that 
provider selects another state’s essential health 
benefits definition would likely be doomed under 
the dormant commerce clause. Yet, because of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, the dormant commerce 
clause does not restrict the states regarding the 
regulation or taxation of insurance. Thus, a state-
level excise tax on insurance plans that use the 
skimpier essential health benefits definitions of 
other states should pass muster under the 
dormant commerce clause.
Second, that kind of tax should also pass 
muster under the equal protection clause because, 
as we have just explained, the tax would be a 
rational response with a legitimate purpose. That 
is, the tax would rationally be aimed at mitigating 
an externality caused by other states’ adoption of 
skimpier essential health benefits definitions. By 
combatting that externality, the tax would 
advance the state’s legitimate interest in 
promoting the viability of in-state insurance 
markets and the consequent health of the state’s 
citizens.
To be sure, the McCarran-Ferguson Act is in 
the crosshairs of Republicans in Congress, 
because it prevents interstate competition that 
would arguably drive insurance prices down. 
Leaving aside whether that argument is correct,13 
it is unlikely that Congress will repeal the act 
8
For a general discussion of employer incentives regarding 
health insurance offerings, see Gamage, “Perverse Incentives 
Arising From the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why 
Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- 




15 U.S.C. section 1011. For the interesting history of this act, 
see Walter Hellerstein and John Swain, State Taxation, section 
3.05[3][a] (3rd ed.).
11
Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. California State Board of 
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 655 (1981) (“We must therefore reject 
Western & Southern’s Commerce Clause challenge to the California 
retaliatory tax: the McCarran-Ferguson Act removes entirely any 
Commerce Clause restriction upon California’s power to tax the 
insurance business”).
12
The test, set forth in Western & Southern Life Insurance, 451 U.S. 
at 668, is that the discriminatory state tax must “bear[] a rational 
relation to a legitimate state purpose.” In this case, the Court 
upheld a retaliatory California tax, though note that the Court 
struck down a discriminatory Alabama tax in Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1975), for failing rational basis 
review.
13
For a concise discussion of some of the issues, see Michael 
Ollove, “Interstate Health Insurance: Sounds Good, but Details Are 
Tricky,” Stateline, the Pew Charitable Trusts, Jan. 18, 2017.
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soon. That kind of repeal could not be 
accomplished through reconciliation, which 
means that it would require 60 votes in the Senate, 
assuming, as is very likely, a Democratic filibuster. 
Leading Republican senators have therefore 
conceded that repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act is unlikely.14
Overall, then, the AHCA would pass state 
governments a very hot potato. But state 
governments should be able to handle that hot 
potato successfully by (a) levying a state-level 
individual mandate, reinsurance and risk-
corridor program, public option, or similar 
measure, as we explained in our prior article,15 
and (b) levying an excise tax on insurance plans 
operating within the state that opt to use a 
skimpier essential health benefits definition of 
another state. For the reasons discussed 
previously, enacting the second of those prongs 
should be within state governments’ power under 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
To foreshadow future directions for analysis, 
we think there could be other ways in which the 
freedom provided by the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
might enable useful state regulatory actions. 
Moreover, in a follow-up article on how state 
governments might respond to federal healthcare 
reform efforts, we plan to explain other options 
for state governments that would remain viable 
even if the McCarran-Ferguson Act were to be 
repealed. 
14
See, e.g., Burgess Everett and Rachel Bade, “Cotton Goes After 








ll rights reserved. Tax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
